For nearly three decades, the word ‘Reformasi’ was at the core of Malaysian politics as a call for the dismantling of the state’s ‘strongman’ architecture. With Anwar’s 2026 New Year’s Address, this movement is now at the desks of Parliament. The sitting unity government has tabled numerous historic bills, concerning PM tenure length, to the separation of the Attorney General’s powers. These changes could be a genuine step towards Malaysian democratisation, but may equally serve as mechanisms for coalition stabilisation. The durability of Malaysian democracy will be dependent less on legislative intent, and more so on whether institutions can operate independently.
Narrative history of reformism in Malaysia: How did we get here?
The 1990s was the start of modern Malaysian pluralism. The early 1990s was Mahathir Mohamad’s first term as PM. His tenure was considered an incredibly successful economic period, but was characterised by executive media control, and limited judicial independence. His sacking of YAB Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim in September of 1998 triggered ‘Agenda Reformasi’, a socio-political movement demanding institutional and democratic changes in Malaysian politics. Later arrested and jailed, Anwar was seen in court with a black eye, which is today, immortalised in the logo of Pakatan Harapan (PH) as a symbol of resistance against executive overreach. This episode shifted discussion around Anwar’s into one for inciting structural reform.
In late 1998, Datin Seri Dr Wan Azizah Wan Ismail initiated the Social Justice Movement (ADIL) as a vehicle to properly facilitate Agenda Reformasi. Failing to register as a party by itself, they merged with PRM to form PKR, contesting BN at the 1999 and 2004 General Election.
Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi was then in power from 2003 to 2009, promising the Rakyat major democratic reforms, thus sparking hope for institutional change. To start with, Abdullah didn’t interfere with the appeal court’s 2004 decision to release Anwar. He formalised the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission, and launched the National Integrity Plan, with a broad goal of reducing corruption and abuse of power, whilst also improving public service delivery. Abdullah famously scolded civil servants who acted independently, publicly calling them “Little Napoleons” who “obstructed and delayed government development plans”. Yet, his failure to truly dismantle them left reform stagnant, fueling the rise of Bersih in 2007, an organisation focused on systemic electoral reform. They held multiple rallies with tens of thousands of participants from 2007-2016, marching for institutional change.
In 2015, PKR joined DAP and Amanah to form PH, solidifying a cohesive opposition to BN. The 2018 victory of PH was the first electoral defeat of BN in six decades, demonstrating that alternation of power was actually possible. Mahathir was placed into office as PM after securing Anwar’s support, opening possibilities for further democratisation.
Yet, the success was short-term, as the 2020 Sheraton Move’s backroom shifts placed Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin into power shortly after Mahathir’s resignation. The King interviewed all candidates possible, selecting Muhyiddin after he had a majority coalition via resigned and reshuffled MPs. This deeply upset the public, as the government was changed only after two years, with no election process; democracy was seemingly very fragile. The political vacuum that emerged led to Malaysia having three different PMs in three years, further dismantling public trust.
In 2022, the GE results was a ‘hung parliament’, where PH had 73 out of 112 seats needed for a majority. The resulting unity government highlights a shift from oppositional reformism, to negotiated governance. The Madani government has a unique challenge: satisfying the public whilst navigating the complex coalition at hand. Anwar’s 2026 New Year’s Address, raises a central question about whether current reforms are designed to diffuse executive power, or manage the coexistence of parties within this unity government.
Examining Anwar’s New Years Address
The symbolic centerpiece of these reforms was the proposed bill to limit the PM’s tenure to 10 years. In practice, this would formally constrain leadership longevity, reducing the possibility of entrenched executive dominance and aiming to enhance public trust. By providing a set amount of tenure, any given PM will be unlikely to call for an early election, promoting political stability for that period. The system will be kept dynamic and forward-leaning with changes in leaders – this helps policies remain relevant and in-line with the country’s priorities. Transitions between leaders could also be smoother, since they would be scheduled. The technical challenge with this is that the Federal Constitution has to be amended, requiring a two-thirds majority, meaning it potentially could not be tabled. On a political level, there’s a potential challenge with administrations weakening towards the end of a PM’s tenure, as they quickly turn to seek out another successor.
He announces that the first bill to be tabled this year is regarding the separation of powers between the Public Prosecutor (PP) and Attorney General (AG). The existing system consists of the Attorney General handling both the Cabinet’s matters and criminal prosecution, which faces criticism because of the potential conflict of interest: political considerations could easily influence decisions on prosecution. This structural reform will manifest in the establishment of a standalone Public Prosecutor Office, who will be granted security of tenure. This reform has potential to strengthen the credibility of the legal system. Political opponents gain protection from the separated system, and the government can deflect accusations of interference in legal cases. In the long-term, this acts as a safeguard against authoritarianism. The split ends the ‘absolute’ discretion of the AG, as the separated PP is more likely to act on professional standards instead of potential political loyalty. However, this prosecutorial independence relies on appointment mechanisms and budgetary autonomy; without insulation from executive influence, structural division may just reallocate political discretion.
Another important bill said to be tabled this year is the Freedom of Information Bill. This directly grants the public the ability to request any piece of information from any ministry or government agency. National intelligence will always be protected, but “commercial-in-confidence” documents will have a high bar for non-release. If implemented properly, this would expand the public’s access to state-held data. The nature of Malaysian journalism will change, as data can be demanded on a variety of topics; previously, reporting unfavourably on a ‘suspicious’ government project was jailable under the Official Secrets Act 1972 (OSA). On an economic level, this could also benefit smaller businesses, who are able to access procurement data, levelling the playing field between state-owned and private businesses. The Bill helps institutions endure via utilising public trust as a vital stabiliser. As the bureaucracy is more accessible, it’s likely that more will have trust in the government: they can actively see how and why decisions are made, eliminating space for conspiracy theories and skepticism. For this to be fully effective, certain measures will have to be in place to reduce the possibility of ‘red tape’ interference, and deny executive overreach. Digitalization of government systems has to be comprehensive and efficient. The aforementioned OSA needs to be amended, or even repealed. Not doing so will result in a clash – officials will still be able to use it to override an FOI request.
Anwar has also proposed a ‘Digital Roll-Out’ to happen, complimenting the FOI Bill, and aiming to boost the efficiency of public services and enhance their overall delivery. Digitalisation may improve administrative targeting and delivery. By modernising and digitalising their processes, they also could reinvest money saved from the streamlining into other faucets, like healthcare, or education. Institutions could be fully interoperable, and files will be less likely to ‘go missing’. The major risk factor is how truly secure the system is: whether it’s able to defend data breaches, as this move will also increase executive informational capacity.
He also announced that Judges’ salaries will be seeing an increase for the first time in a decade. This was done with the goal to strengthen judicial independence and acknowledge this lack of pay increases for judges, adjusting their pays in accordance to the rising costs of living. The 30% increase may improve retention and professional attractiveness, combatting recent brain drain from the benches to private firms. Whether this translates into greater judicial autonomy depends heavily on available safeguards against executive pressure.
Conclusion
Understanding the path from 1998’s Reformasi Movement to the proposed reform package of 2026 suggests that Malaysian democracy is entering a phase of institutional negotiation, rather than linear liberalisation. The reforms may fortify checks on executive authority, but may also serve to formalise power-sharing arrangements within the unity government. Democratic endurance therefore rides heavily on implementation, legal passage, and autonomy of institutions.
Photo Credit: Fath Rizal @ Prime Minister’s Office of Malaysia
